



HPAIR 2003

The 12th Annual Conference of the
Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations
Seoul, South Korea, August 21-24, 2003

Conference Report for Workshop 3

Challenges to Prosperity and Peace *Charting Asia's Security Landscape*

Leif-Eric Easley
Security Workshop Chair

Table of Contents

Introduction to HPAIR and the security workshop	3
Workshop agenda	4
Speaker biographies	5
Discussion leader biographies	8
Workshop white papers (produced by student delegate discussion groups)	
The Clash of Ideational and Material Interests in the Taiwan Strait	10
Survey of Selected Strategic Issues in Cross Strait Relations	16
Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Unique Characteristics and Appropriate Solutions	19
Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia: Chances of a Nuclear Conflict	22
US-Japan Security Alliance in a Dynamic Asia: Prospects and Challenges	26
Preventing North Korea's Nuclear Armament	30
Deconstructing the North Korea Nuclear Crisis: A Chinese Blueprint	33
Abstracts of security papers to be published in the HPAIR conference proceeding	35
Conference Photos	39

Dear Distinguished Speakers, Student Delegates, Friends and Colleagues:

It is my honor to report the successful completion of the Security Workshop of the 12th annual Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR). HPAIR began as a student organization at Harvard University and has since grown to become the largest student conference of its kind in the Asia Pacific region, bringing together academic, political and business leaders with students from around the world. This year, the HPAIR security workshop in particular witnessed a substantive upgrade with a more extensive program of presentations by prominent scholars and analysts, and the drafting of student white papers by seven undergraduate workgroups facilitated by graduate student discussion leaders.

The workshop provided an unusual opportunity for students to interact with academics, analysts and policymakers about current research and developments in Asian security. Professor Acharya and Professor Kang supplied a theoretical background for student discussion and engaged us in an academic debate based on their current exchange in the journal *International Security*. Professor Baum, a foremost expert on Chinese politics, delineated the critical issues for cross-Strait relations and the domestic political constraints faced by the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Professor Shen added an insightful perspective on Chinese security concerns, particularly regarding arms control and military strategy. Professor Moon led a lively student discussion on North-South Korean relations, informed by his theoretic and practical expertise of the security environment on the Peninsula. Mr. Wit shared his experience as a diplomat, reviewing the history of US-DPRK negotiations and analyzing the current framework of multilateral talks. Finally, Dr. Alagappa, in a presentation on Asia's regional security order, tied together many of the key issues examined by students at the conference, including the role of the US-Japan security alliance, Southeast Asian regionalism, and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia. In conference wide sessions, Mr. Wit, Professor Moon, Professor Kang and Professor Ahn debated the North Korean nuclear crisis, Kim Dae Jung delivered the keynote address, and closing remarks were offered by Long Yongtu, Ban Kimoon and Ezra Vogel.

In addition to substantive sessions, we visited the DMZ to see firsthand a persisting legacy of the Cold War – viewed optimistically as a bridgeable divide for a reunified and peaceful Peninsula, and pessimistically as an ongoing war zone. We also visited the Korean War Memorial Museum, to gain an appreciation of the history behind our discussions and the terrible realities of war. Most notably, students put forth great effort over the five-day conference in discussion groups focusing on particular areas of Asian security. Each group produced and presented a white paper, which together make up the body of this report. Also included are speaker and discussion leader biographies and abstracts of security related papers that will be published in the 2003 HPAIR conference proceeding.

I humbly thank our distinguished speakers, outstanding discussion leaders and Harvard/Sookmyung logistical staffs for their tremendous efforts. And I congratulate our student delegates on their individual contributions that combined to make the workshop a great success. Together, you represent the most talented group I have worked with in six years of involvement with HPAIR. I hope you will capitalize on the conference's networking potential: stay in touch, continue our dialogue and maintain professional relationships initiated at HPAIR. It was a great pleasure and enriching experience to work with you – I look forward to future exchanges advancing our common interest in charting Asia's security landscape and addressing challenges to prosperity and peace.

Sincerely,

Leif-Eric Easley
HPAIR Security Workshop Chair
easley@fas.harvard.edu

Schedule for Workshop 3:

Challenges to Prosperity and Peace: Charting Asia's Security Landscape

Wednesday, August 20

- 9:00am DMZ tour departs from COEX
- 7:00pm Discussion leaders meeting at hotel lobby

Thursday, August 21 (CoEx Intercontinental Hotel)

- 9:15am Opening Ceremony, keynote address by Kim Dae Jung
- 11:00 Leif-Eric Easley: workshop introduction, formation of delegate discussion groups
- 2:15pm Amitav Acharya: Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Past, Present and Future (Southeast Asia focus)
- 3:15 David Kang: The Rise of China and the US Role in Asia
- 4:00 Coffee break
- 4:30 Acharya, Kang academic debate on Asian Security, Sovereignty, Hierarchy and the Future Regional Order
- 6:00 Discussion groups

Friday, August 22 (CoEx Intercontinental Hotel)

- 9:15am Discussion groups
- 10:30 Richard Baum: Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Domestic Political Constraints
- 11:30 Strategies for Addressing the North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Mr. Wit, Prof. Moon, Prof. Kang, Prof. Ahn
- 2:30pm Chung-in Moon: North-South Korean Reconciliation and Coping with the Nuclear Standoff
- 3:15 Dingli Shen: China's Arms Control and Security Policy
- 4:00 Coffee break
- 4:30 Discussion groups

Saturday, August 23 (Sookmyung University)

- 3:00pm Joel Wit: The Agreed Framework and US-DPRK Negotiations (Historical Perspective)
- 4:00 War Memorial Museum Tour departs Sookmyung
- 5:00 Museum Curator lecture on history of the Korean War
- 6:30 Return bus arrives at COEX
- night Discussion groups work late to complete white papers

Sunday, August 24 (Sookmyung University)

- 10:00am Muthiah Alagappa: Asian Security Order (International Relations Theory)
- 11:00 Discussion groups
- 3:00pm Discussion group presentations
- 7:00 Gala Dinner – COEX Intercontinental Ballroom
Closing remarks by Long Yongtu, Ban Kimoon and Ezra Vogel

Speaker Biographies

Professor Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also holds a professorship. He is on leave as a Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto. His areas of specialization include Asian regionalism and multilateralism, regional security and international relations theory. Acharya has held fellowships in Singapore, Malaysia and at Harvard. He has published over 100 academic papers and four books. Among his latest publications are *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Routledge, 2001), and *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific* (Times Academic Press, 2002). His earlier book, *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*, (Oxford, 2000) was reviewed in the *Journal of Pacific Affairs* as the “as the best work on Southeast Asian regionalism available.” Acharya is a member of the Expert Group of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a member of the Advisory Board of the Centre for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He sits on the editorial board of the journals *Pacific Review*, *Pacific Affairs*, and *Global Governance* and co-edits of the Asian Security monograph series published by Stanford University Press.

Dr. Muthiah Alagappa is Director of the East-West Center Washington. He is an expert in Asian international security, comparative politics and civil society. He has served as a Visiting Professor at Columbia, Stanford and, Keio Universities. He is editor of the Asian Security Book Series and Contemporary Issues of the Asia-Pacific Book Series of the East-West Center published by Stanford University Press. He is an editorial board member of *The Pacific Review*, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, and *Asian Review*. He is also editor of the recent publications *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative* (Stanford University Press 2003), *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford University Press 2001) and *Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001). Dr. Alagappa earned his Ph.D. in International Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Professor Richard Baum is Director of the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies. He is author and editor of eight books on Chinese politics and numerous articles. During his 35 years on the faculty, he has held visiting scholar or professor appointments in China (Beijing University), Japan (Meiji Gakuin University), Hong Kong (Chinese University of Hong Kong), India (Delhi University), Sweden (Lund University), and the Netherlands (Leiden University). His recent work concerns (1) the impact of China’s post-Mao reforms on local governance in the PRC; (2) globalization and political institutionalization in post-reform China; and (3) US-China relations and the prospects for war and peace across the Taiwan Strait. Dr. Baum has served on the editorial board of the *Journal of Contemporary China*, *The China Quarterly*, *China Information*, *Asian Survey*, and *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. As a media commentator, Professor Baum shares his expertise on Chinese Politics with CNN International, the BBC, NPR, the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, *South China Morning Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Voice of America* (VOA).

Professor David C. Kang is Associate Professor of Government, and Adjunct Associate Professor and Research Director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. He has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck he teaches a course on doing business in Asia, and also manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program that conduct in-country consulting projects for multinational companies in Asia. Kang's books include *Crony Capitalism: corruption and development in Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), and *Nuclear North Korea: A debate over engagement strategies* (co-authored with Victor Cha) (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in journals such as *International Organization*, *International Security*, *Comparative Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Foreign Policy*, *World Development*, *Journal of Development Studies*, *Orbis*, and *Security Studies*. He has also appeared on *The News Hour* with Jim Lehrer, CNN's "Moneyline with Lou Dobbs," the CNN financial news programs "Street Sweep," and "Money and Markets," and the BBC World News Service, as well as numerous radio programs. Kang has also written opinion pieces in the *New York Times*, the *Financial Times*, and the *Los Angeles Times*. Kang is a member of the editorial boards of *Business and Politics* and the *Journal of International Business Education*. Professor Kang lived for over three years in Korea, has traveled extensively throughout Asia, and has consulted for U.S. and Asian firms across the Pacific. Kang has been a visiting associate professor at Yale University, a visiting assistant professor at Korea University in Seoul, and a visiting professor at U.C. San Diego. He received an A.B. with honors from Stanford University (1988) and his Ph.D. from Berkeley (1995).

Professor Chung-in Moon is professor of political science at Yonsei University and served as dean of its Graduate School of International Studies. He is also an adjunct professor of the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute, Duke University. Prior to joining the Yonsei faculty, he taught at the University of Kentucky, the Williams College, and the University of California at San Diego. He has published 19 books and over 180 articles in edited volumes and such scholarly journals as *World Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Development*, and the *Journal of Asian Studies*. His recent publications include *State, Market and Just Growth*, *Understanding Korean Politics*, and *Ending the Cold War in Korea*. His comments and op-ed articles have frequently appeared in *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, *NBC*, *CNN*, *BBC*, *Asahi Shimbun*, and *Yomiuri Shimbun*. He currently serves as an advisor to the National Security Council of the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of National Defense, and the ROK Air Force. He accompanied president Kim Dae-jung as a special delegate to the 2000 Pyongyang summit. Dr. Moon was also appointed as a member of president-elect Roh Moo-hyun's high level delegation to the U.S. He made one week trip to North Korea in late March. He is currently Vice President of the International Studies Association of North America.

Professor Dingli Shen is a physicist by training, is a professor of international relations at Fudan University. He is the founder and director of China's first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security, at Fudan University's Center for American Studies, where he is a Deputy Director. Dr. Shen teaches nonproliferation and international security, and China's foreign policy, in China and the US. His research areas cover China-U.S. security and nuclear relationship, regional security and nonproliferation issues, and China's foreign and

defense policies. Dr. Shen is a member of IISS and a number of other international organizations. He is on the editorial board of South Asia Studies (China), Fudan Journal Social Sciences (China), Journal of Contemporary China (U.S.), Journal of East Asian Studies (ROK/Japan/Taiwan), and, INESAP Information Bulletin (Germany). In January 2002 he was invited by the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan to advise on strategy planning for his second term, as the sole Chinese out of 40 persons chosen worldwide. Dr. Shen received his Ph.D. in physics in 1989 from Fudan University and did a post-doc in arms control at Princeton University from 1989-1991. In 1997, he was awarded an Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship. From 1997-2000, he served as Fudan University's Director of Office of International Programs.

Mr. Joel S. Wit is a senior fellow with the International Security Program, working on Northeast Asian security issues as well as weapons proliferation. He served for 15 years in the Department of State in positions related to Northeast Asia, nuclear arms control, and weapons proliferation. He was most recently the coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and was responsible for U.S. policy related to the implementation of that agreement. From 1993 to 1995, Mr. Wit served as senior adviser to Robert L. Gallucci, ambassador-at-large in charge of policy towards North Korea, where he worked on U.S. strategy to resolve the 1994 nuclear crisis, was in charge of the interagency sanctions working group, and led the U.S. effort to establish a new international organization, KEDO, to implement the Agreed Framework. He has also served in a variety of positions, primarily in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. He was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). He worked in the bureau's Policy Planning Office on ballistic missile proliferation and arms control, and he served as the senior State Department officer responsible for implementation of the Nunn-Lugar initiative to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. In addition to his work at the State Department, Mr. Wit has served as a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. He holds a master's degree in international security studies from Columbia University and a bachelor's degree in international affairs from Bucknell University.

Discussion Leader Biographies

Hsin-hui Serena Chang (Discussion Leader – the International Status of Taiwan, the Increasing Political and Economic Strength of the People’s Republic of China and the Military Build-up Across the Strait) is graduating with a second Masters in Political Science from McGill University. She grew up in Taiwan and moved to Montreal, Canada with her family when she was 17. She completed her BA in Political Science at McGill and her first MA degree in East Asian Studies at the University of Toronto. Her current research interests include nationalism, democratization, and the making of foreign policy in developing states. She is particularly interested in these issues in the context of Taiwan. Serena plans to pursue a Ph.D. in Political Science studying politics of nationalism in Taiwan and Mainland China.

Leif-Eric Easley (Workshop Chair – Challenges to Prosperity and Peace: Charting Asia’s Security Landscape) is a Ph.D. student at Harvard University’s Department of Government. He holds a B.A. in Political Science, International Relations with a minor in Mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he graduated Senior of the Year. Leif presented his honors thesis, “Theater Missile Defense: Balancing the Japan-PRC-Taiwan Triangle” at several international conferences and has studied and traveled extensively in Asia and Europe. He worked with security specialists at policy research centers in Los Angeles (RAND) and Washington, D.C. (Henry L. Stimson Center). Leif is a long-time affiliate of HPAIR, serving as a delegate (1997-2000), presenter (2001-02) and security workshop chair (2003). His research interests broadly include East Asian security, political economics and US foreign policy.

Daniel Kliman (Discussion Leader – the Future of the US-Japan Alliance and the Role of Both Countries in Asian security) is a senior at Stanford University majoring in political science. He is originally from Santa Barbara, California. Daniel’s interest in East Asia stems from his extensive research on US-Japan ballistic missile defense cooperation. Daniel plans to enter graduate school as a Ph.D. candidate in political science or public policy. Having interned with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the US Embassy in Tokyo, Daniel aspires to serve in government as a foreign policymaker.

Tai Wei Lim (Discussion Leader – the International Status of Taiwan, the Increasing Political and Economic Strength of the People’s Republic of China and the Military Build-up Across the Strait) is currently a Ph.D. student and SAGE/SCT scholar at Cornell University. He is a graduate of the National University of Singapore and holds a law degree from the University of London. He is an Overseas Research Fellow with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, specializing in East Asian Regionalism and has participated in Singapore and ASEAN Track II diplomacy in the ASEAN-China Security Dialogue in 2002. Tai Wei has received fellowships from the Japan Foundation, Japan Airlines, Mitsui-Toatsu, Sanwa Bank and the Tan Kah Kee Foundation. He has presented his papers on China and Japan at the Columbia East Asian conference (2001) and Harvard East Asian student conference (HEAS 2003).

Jerry Meyerle (Discussion Leader – Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia) is a graduate student in politics at the University of Virginia where he pursues interests in comparative politics, security issues, and South Asia. He was previously a reporter at the Times of India and Indian Express newspapers, and at the Daily Progress in Charlottesville, Virginia. He has been studying Urdu in India for the past several months. Jerry is interested in the question of how states provide security to their people, and how new weapons and forms of warfare undermine human security. He will be in India next year conducting research on Indian foreign policy before returning to Virginia to finish his Ph.D.

Dr. John Park (Discussion Leader – North-South Korean Relations and Regional Cooperation Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program) is a research fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. from Cambridge University where he was a Canadian Government Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellow. Dr. Park has given lectures and presented papers on North Korea in the US, Canada, UK and Australia. He has also advised hedge funds, institutional investors and private equity firms in the U.S., Britain and Hong Kong regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis. Prior to re-joining the Kennedy School of Government, Dr. Park worked in Goldman Sachs’s M&A Advisory Group in Hong Kong and the Boston Consulting Group’s Financial Services Practice in Seoul. His current research project focuses on nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula – specifically, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship strategy and South Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.

Steven S. Park (Discussion Leader – North-South Korean Relations and Regional Cooperation Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program) is a graduate student in Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also a Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer with the U.S. Army, and has traveled extensively through South Korea, Japan, Northeast China, and the Russian Far East. Continuing his work as a Foreign Area Officer, Steve will serve on both policy and defense attaché staff. Steve received his B.A. in political science from the California State University, Fullerton, and his Master of Public Administration from the University of Alaska, Anchorage. He is also a graduate of the Republic of Korea Army Command and Staff College as a foreign exchange officer.

Robert Zarate (Discussion leader—Terrorism vs. Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia) is a graduate student in the Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences (MAPSS) at the University of Chicago. His areas of interest are East Asian security issues, Cold War nuclear strategy and deterrence, suicide terrorism, and international relations theory. Prior to graduate school, Robert served on the staff of the Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines to the United States, and later wrote for *Wired News* and *E-Commerce Law Week* in Washington, D.C. As an undergraduate he studied English literature at the University of Chicago. For more information on Robert’s work, visit www.robertzarate.org.

The Clash of Ideational and Material Interests in the Taiwan Strait

Discussion Leader: Hsin-Hui Serena Chang, *McGill University, Canada/Taiwan*

Delegates: Brooke Greene, *University of Virginia, United States*
Vong-on Phuaphansawat, *Chulalongkorn University, Thailand*
Key-young Son, *University of Sheffield, United Kingdom*
Norleen Gabriel Violata, *Miriam College, Philippines*

Introduction

An analysis of the international security challenges in the Asian region must place at its center a consideration of the enduring conflict between China and Taiwan. Indeed, it seems undeniable that, whatever course the future takes, the outcome of this conflict will play a major role in determining whether the Asian region will prove “ripe for rivalry” or will instead become “primed for peace.” With China, formally the People’s Republic of China, rapidly becoming one of Asia’s most powerful states, possessing a vastly expanding economy, one-sixth of the world’s population, and nuclear capabilities, its propensity for international conflict necessarily assumes monumental importance for the stability of the Asian region. This significance is further heightened by the fact that the debate over Taiwan’s international status is not limited to Asia but is extended across the Pacific by the United States’ ambiguous role in the conflict. Simply, the China-Taiwan dilemma raises critical questions regarding the norms of international recognition, the limits of legitimate military action, and external intervention that render its careful analysis indispensable to a thorough understanding of the Asian security landscape. Because of this reality, this report strives to elucidate the key elements of the conflict over the Taiwan Strait in a framework enhancing the study of international relations in the Asian region. While the piece addresses multiple facets of the dilemma, its focus is primarily on the unique problems facing Taiwan vis-à-vis China.

Theoretical Framings

Analysis of issues as complex as that of the Taiwan-China conflict can be advanced significantly by a consideration of theoretical perspectives. While a complete theoretical survey is beyond the scope of this work, one major theoretical battle does seem key to the understanding of the issues involved, specifically the debate between realist and idealist understandings of national interest. From a realist perspective, what matters to nations are concrete considerations of power and wealth, and weak nations are expected to comply with the wishes of the stronger. However, from an idealist perspective, material interests of power and wealth are not the sole factor in international relations, but rather norms and ideas matter as well. In considering the conflict over the Taiwan Strait, one observes at work both traditional realist concerns of power politics, as well as ideational forces deeper than mere estimates of political gain. Indeed, from the Taiwanese perspective, it almost seems that the two forces are working at cross-purposes. As Chung-In Moon said in reference to the North Korean dilemma, nations generally desire to be both “strong and prosperous,” that is they desire military and political strength as well as economic growth (Moon lecture, 22 August 2003). However, at times, one goal may have to be

sacrificed or reevaluated for the other, and this may well be the case for Taiwan. With this theoretical framing and an understanding of conflicting national goals in mind, the details of the issue can now be more properly understood.

Historical Background: Taiwan's International Status and Cross-Strait Conflicts

In order to understand the current conflict between China and Taiwan, one must place it in historical context. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the late 19th century after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and was returned to China by the major powers after World War II. In 1949, the KMT (Guomindang) government under Chiang Kai-Shek lost the civil war on Mainland China and retreated with its army to Taiwan. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 secured the survival of the KMT on Taiwan, as the US government concluded that the communist takeover of Taiwan would be a security threat to Americans and, as a result, offered military protection to Taiwan. From the 1950s until the 1980s, Beijing and Taipei engaged in a competition for international recognition. Because both sides were committed to the one-China principle, a country's formal recognition of one of the Chinas necessarily precluded its formation of a relationship with the other. Before the 1970s, Taipei was able to surpass the PRC in the competition for diplomatic recognition. However, the situation changed fundamentally when Beijing replaced Taipei's membership in the UN. After 1971, the ROC steadily began losing diplomatic recognition.

Beginning in the 1980s, Taipei started to show a greater degree of pragmatism in its relationship with the PRC. It reached an agreement with Beijing to participate in international organizations such as the Olympic Games and the Asian Development Bank by agreeing not to use its official national designation. However, in the 1990s, Taiwan's policy of international recognition changed significantly, largely due to domestic factors. Economic prosperity and social development made the islanders aspire for a higher international status. Moreover, the rapid process of democratization in Taiwan provided a channel for the voices of Taiwanese independence. Rejoining the UN, one of the major policy goals of the pro-independent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), soon became a popular national objective. In 1993, Taipei started its bid to re-enter the United Nations.

However, Taiwan's demand for greater international recognition soon generated security concerns. In 1995, after President Lee Teng-hui was granted a visa by the US to give a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, China launched a series of missiles in the Taiwan Strait. A larger scale of military exercise and missile launching by the PLA occurred in 1996, just before the first direct presidential election held on the island. The US soon intervened by dispatching two aircraft carrier groups to the East China Sea. Even though Beijing's coercive use of force to prevent the election of President Lee failed, it gave a clear signal that any demand for a higher international status would lead to the use of force on the part of the PRC.

Ideational Interests and the Force of Nationalism

One operating from a strictly realist perspective might, upon initial consideration, find it difficult to understand why, after two decades of détente, the cross-Strait military tension suddenly escalated in the mid-1990s, despite the fact that both economic and social interactions across the Strait had quickly expanded since the late 1980s. To understand this conflict and the motivations of all of the actors involved, one must move beyond a strictly materialist conception of state interest. Indeed, to understand the conflict over the Taiwan Strait, one must understand the tremendous power of ideas.

The Taiwanese Perspective

The origins of the Taiwanese nationalism in existence today can be traced to the Chinese cession of Taiwan to Japan over one century ago. For fifty years Taiwan was in many respects a Japanese colony, and this “Japanization” of the inhabitants of Taiwan would have consequences long after Taiwan was restored to China. The cession of Taiwan to Japan meant that Taiwan and China would have two very different histories. Mainland Chinese identity, that is a sense of unified “Chinese-ness” developed in the early decades of the 20th century and was further fostered by the Mainland experiences of the war against Japan and, later, the civil conflict between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. However, because Taiwan was not part of China during these extremely important, identity-defining times in the history of the Mainland, the Taiwanese did not share fully in the construction of Mainland Chinese identity.

Compounding this sense of Taiwanese separateness from the Mainland was the nature of the regime that ruled Taiwan after the restoration of Taiwan to China. The KMT regime gained control of Taiwan in 1945, and from the start the regime was characterized by high degrees of corruption. Ethnic Taiwanese were deprived of the opportunity to serve in the government, and mass movements, like that occurred in 1947, were bloodily suppressed by the regime. This early repressive rule of the KMT contributed to the emergence of a Taiwanese nationalism that was based on a narrowly defined ethnic Taiwanese identity. Although initially this nationalism was possessed by a relatively small percentage of the population and was notably absent from the KMT leaders in the government, Taiwanese nationalism only gained more popular support during the 1980s, a time during which Taiwanese civil society was developing rapidly. In the 1990s this nationalism became even more mainstream as the ethnic concept of Taiwanese identity was gradually transformed into a more territorially defined concept. Indeed, more and more people identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese today. In 1989 a study conducted by a large Taiwanese newspaper revealed that 52% of residents identified themselves as Chinese and 7% labeled themselves as Taiwanese while a similar study conducted in 1993 found that 44% considered themselves Chinese and 17% were willing to identify themselves as uniquely Taiwanese (Chang 11).

Of course, this rising force of nationalism affected what was politically feasible for the Taiwanese government to achieve in its relations with the Mainland without sacrificing domestic support. Undoubtedly, unification with the Mainland became a less preferred solution for Taiwan’s future, and the pursuit of *de jure* sovereignty gradually became a popular policy project. The 2003 SARS experience in Taiwan further fuelled a desire for international recognition of Taiwan, as Taiwan’s lack of membership in the World Health Organization resulted in a less than ideal response to the manifestation of the global health crisis in Taiwan (Baum lecture, 22 August 2003). Overall, a sense of Taiwanese identity separate from China is a strong force in Taiwan today and explains Taiwan’s unwillingness to comply in absolute terms with the demands of the PRC, despite the reality of its weakness in material terms vis-à-vis the Mainland.

The Chinese Perspective

While, as mentioned above, the Chinese perspective will not be examined in as great of detail as was the Taiwanese perspective, it is fruitful to consider briefly the reasons that Taiwan is so important to the Mainland. Interestingly, the reasons are largely ideological and are, like the Taiwanese nationalist movements, rooted in a conception of national identity and a sense of

pride for national accomplishments. Despite the reality of Japanese control of Taiwan in the early twentieth century, Taiwan had historically been part of China for hundreds of years. Moreover, throughout much of China's history, great importance has been placed on Chinese unity and civility in contrast to the barbarity of other peoples. This strong sense of identity became even more salient in the wake of the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the Mainland in 1949. The rhetoric of "One China" became an essential stance of the Mainland government and, its resilience over the past fifty years arguably reveals its significance to post-1949 Chinese identity. Thus, what was a key element of Mainland identity prior to 1949 became further solidified by the policies of the post-1949 regime. While the CCP has been willing to compromise somewhat on the rhetoric of "One China" in order to achieve material gains, for example by recourse to the rhetoric of "One China, Many Interpretations" (Wang 730), it has absolutely refused to accede to Taiwanese demands that threaten to topple the identity created by the CCP over the past fifty years of rule. Thus, in order to understand the importance of Taiwan to the Mainland, one must look beyond strictly material interests to the central elements of Chinese identity.

Material Interests

The Taiwanese Perspective

Despite the increasing saliency of Taiwanese desires for independence, in recent years Taiwan's nationalist impulses and distrust of the Mainland have been tempered by concrete material interests. As Professor Richard Baum of the UCLA Department of Political Science has noted, during the late 1990s, Taiwan, which was once heralded as an Asian economic miracle, began to suffer an economic downturn that was exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Baum lecture, 22 August 2003). Starting from the mid-1980s, Taiwan's labor-intensive and other high-cost industries were under great pressure as socio-economic developments on the island had greatly increased the labor cost. Many of Taiwan's manufacturers searched to relocate their factories offshore to lower cost locations. Mainland China, with its cheap labor and huge market, became attractive to Taiwanese businessmen. Beginning in the 1980s, Taiwanese businessmen had engaged in Mainland economics through clandestine means. However, with the Taiwanese economic liberalization of 1991, investment in China, provided that it proceeded through indirect channels, became legal, and investment increased rapidly for the next several years. Nevertheless, it was not long before the tension between economic growth and political security began to reveal itself.

The Taiwanese government, wary of becoming economically dependent upon China, especially in the aftermath of the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis of 1995, sought to curb large-scale investment in the mainland (Leng 501-503). However, as the relationship between China and Taiwan entered a state of quiescence during late 1990s, economic pressures again forced the Taiwanese government to moderate its policies (Sutter 523), and many of these restrictions were lifted in 2001. With China "emerging as the center of growth of East Asia" (Sutter 27), it seemed that even serious security concerns could not preclude Taiwanese economic interaction with the mainland indefinitely.

Although internal Taiwanese policy towards one-sided investment in China may have stabilized, the tensions that motivated the trade restrictions have by no means subsided. Today Taiwan is the third largest investor in China (Baum lecture), and its economic success is becoming increasingly intertwined with that of China. To some in the Taiwanese government and in the international community as a whole, this economic integration is a risky move for

Taiwan. Becoming economically dependent on the Mainland could make it highly vulnerable to political manipulation by the government in Beijing and make its desires for independence wholly unfeasible.

Despite the reality of these concerns, other analysts argue that these dire predictions are unlikely to be realized. To these thinkers, trade and economic integration between China and Taiwan is beneficial to the economies of both. Likewise, such thinkers suggest that increasing interaction could be a force for compromise and moderation that could eventually lead to a less tenuous relationship between the two. However, predictions aside, it is clear that to some extent desire for economic success is counteracting the sometimes extreme nationalist sentiments of those on Taiwan.

The Chinese Perspective

As mentioned above, trade and economic integration are mutually beneficial for China and Taiwan. However, mutuality does not necessarily translate to equality as there is extreme asymmetry in the economic relationship of the two. While Taiwan's economy is becoming dependant on that of the Mainland, China, with its immense size and market base, possesses less such dependency. Thus, while the Mainland indeed possesses material interests in the promotion of economic interaction with Taiwan, its financial interests do not extend to the same degree as do Taiwan's. For China, the primary material interest in the crisis in the Straits should be properly viewed as the maintenance of its power: its power status and its prestige. While this interest is not as concrete as economic incentives, realists generally hold power as a material interest, and power is surely the primary material interest at stake in the Taiwan-Chinese crisis.

Conclusions and Prescriptions

Undeniably, from the Taiwanese perspective, there are two contradictory forces at play in cross-strait relations: economic interaction tends to bind the two states across the Strait, while nationalism tends to foster separation. Increasingly, however, the motive of economic growth is taking the forefront, and *de facto* integration of the two areas economically and culturally does not seem an impossibility. The future of the China-Taiwan conflict depends largely on each party's relative valuing of material and ideational interests, that is, whether each party is willing to sacrifice ideological rigidity for practical progress in its relationship with the other. To this end, it seems desirable that both parties begin to consider a spectrum of possibilities for the redefinition of their relationship. Possible arrangements include governing forms based on the principle of divided sovereignty, such as a confederation. Both sides may also choose to shelve sovereignty disputes while establishing a mechanism for official dialogue and engaging in promoting cross-Strait socio-economic developments. Reunification and independence are by no means the only options, but unfortunately, they are frequently viewed as such by the involved parties. By considering other options and balancing material and ideational interests, Taiwan and China can ensure that they are both strong and prosperous well into the future.

References

Chang, Hsin-hui S. "Taiwanese Nationalism and the Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan," paper presented at HPAIR 2003 Seoul.

Baum, Richard, "Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Domestic Political Constrains," lecture at HPAIR 2003 Seoul, Aug. 22, 03.

Leng, Tse-Kang, "Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The Role of Private Firms," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 5, May 1998, pp. 494-509.

Moon, Chung-In, "Coping with the North Korean Nuclear Standoff: A South Korean Perspective," lecture at HPAIR 2003 Seoul, Aug. 22, 03.

Sutter, Karen M., "Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait: The implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 3 May/June 2002, pp. 522-40.

Wang, T. Y. "Cross-Strait Relations After the 2000 Election in Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 2001, pp. 716-36

Survey of Selected Strategic Issues in Cross Strait Relations

Discussion Leader: Tai Wei Lim, *Cornell University, Singapore*

Delegates: Ryo Sahashi, *University of Tokyo, Japan*
Silu Huang, *Peking University, People's Republic of China*
Jing Gao, *Peking University, People's Republic of China*
Kwong Man Norman Fung, *HKUST, Hong Kong*
E nuo Zhao, *Peking University, People's Republic of China*

Introduction

Due to the complexity of China-Taiwan relations, only some key issues will be surveyed in this white paper, divided into the triangular relationship between China, US and Taiwan, strategic nuclear dimensions, and economic considerations.

The Triangular Relationship

The triangular relationship between these three countries is characterized by strong interwovenness. The economic growth of China and the end of the Cold War leaving the US as the sole superpower in the world has acutely accentuated this feature. Because the Chinese consumer market is projected to increase dramatically in size and its labor production base has become crucial for American companies' competitiveness, stakes have become higher to see that Sino-US relations does not deteriorate irreparably.

In the US-China aspect of the triangular relationship, the political dilemma for the US is clear. On the one hand, it wants to maintain economic cooperation with the Chinese but they are ambivalent about their own obligations and commitments to Taiwan. In an almost routinized manner, to keep Taiwan in line, China will continue the policy of not rejecting the use of force to realize unification and warn Taiwan militarily when necessary. The Americans are also aware of Chinese efforts to upgrade the PLA that will incur more criticisms from the US. In the worst case scenario, if Taiwan declares independence, the Chinese military will take actions against Taiwan. In this case, the Americans are expected by their Taiwanese allies to defend the island against such an attack.

Between China and Taiwan, several issues remain crucial. First, there seems to be a perception gap in the political compatibility of both countries. One of the main problems of the Taiwan issue is that many in the US and Taiwan think that, because China is a socialist country and less democratic than Taiwan, it may not be possible for the Taiwanese to politically accept the idea of unification. However, at the same time, despite this perceived political incompatibility, China has developed deep and extensive economic links with Taiwan. The Chinese government encourages Taiwanese investments on the mainland while Taiwanese businesses see ample economic opportunities and affordable labor in the mainland.

Due to the close economic exchanges between the three countries, if any conflict breaks out, it will hurt the national interests of the three countries. It is perhaps due to this reason that many players in this relationship seem to favor a status quo where the US deliberately remains ambivalent about its support for Taiwan. The new Chinese leadership also seems to have adopted a perspective of intensifying communications with the US in order to foster a better bilateral

understanding. This is especially true since China realizes that it is still far behind the US in terms of military capabilities.

Economic Considerations in Cross-Straits Relations

It is clear to many observers that economic interchanges between China and Taiwan have impacted a great deal on their bilateral relations. China has to tread carefully between pressing for a military option and economic mutualism in dealing with Taiwan. Between 1991-2002, gross bilateral trade increased from US\$8.1 billion to US\$39.6 billion. Taiwanese exports to China increased 35.4 % while Chinese exports to Taiwan have increased by 30.7%. Other than trade, Taiwanese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in China is estimated to be around 60-100 billion USD. In fact, the trend points towards Taiwan businesses generating more investment and business transactions in China. Taiwanese economic interest in China either as a market or as a production base is augmented by weakness in the Taiwanese economy.

Other than the Chinese perspective, the increased economic exchanges also impact on domestic Taiwanese politics. Taiwanese business leaders have begun to exert pressures on the Taiwanese government to expand business contacts with China. This has also stimulated backlash in Taiwan's domestic politics as there is growing realization of Taiwanese dependence on China. Taiwanese against expanding economic contact with China argue that this has made Taiwan vulnerable to political shocks similar to how the 1996 Straits missile crisis caused the Taiwanese stock market to decline drastically in value.

The Nuclear Dimension

In the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, many speculate whether Beijing would use strategic nuclear weapons. There are several hypotheticals, both likely and unlikely. There are three likely concerns: first, a Chinese missile build-up will increase in long-range missiles and MIRVs with possible deployment in Fujian province to keep pressure on Taiwan. A second factor is the level of Taiwanese interest in the US missile defense system. Thirdly, it is likely that Japan will deploy the missile defense supplied by the US. Because the proposed Japanese system is half sea-based, it can be transferred to the Strait very easily with joint action between Japan and the US.

It is perhaps unlikely that Taiwan will develop nuclear weapons as it may lead to the isolation of Taiwan. Additionally, with the "no-first-use policy" as public statement and with minimal nuclear deterrence with the US, it is very unlikely for the Beijing government to use nuclear weapons first. This view resonates in Washington as well, as American administrations have regarded Chinese political leaders as rational players since the development and deployment of nuclear warheads and missiles from the 1960s. Like the economic aspects, there seems to be a tendency towards keeping the status quo and avoiding any military action that may disrupt stability across the Strait. Along this line, any missile defense systems in Taiwan would be a disruption to cross straits relations, especially in light of vastly improved relations between Washington and Beijing.

Conclusion

The greater interwovenness among the three countries has resulted in restrictive conditions that tend towards maintaining the status quo, both in the strategic military as well as economic spheres. It is likely that potentially disruptive issues like missile defense systems or the anti-China investments lobby in Taiwan will continue to be an active force. However, as long as

economic cooperation between China and Taiwan as well as the US deepens, the economic stakes in preserving peace and stability in the Straits will remain considerable. Similarly, it may also lead to compromise in the military sphere with Taiwan conceptualized as a site for mobile sea-based systems instead of becoming a permanent site for the missile defense system.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Unique Characteristics and Appropriate Solutions

Discussion Leader: Robert Zarate, *University of Chicago, United States*

Delegates: Scott Anderson, *University of Virginia, United States*
Vanessa Kris Cancino, *Miriam College, Philippines*
Kasira Cheeppensook, *Chulalongkorn University, Thailand*
Yusri Darmadi, *Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta, Indonesia*
Carl Nicholas Ng, *University of the Philippines, Philippines*
Andrew Schorr, *Washington and Lee University, United States*
Diana Cecilia Triviño, *Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines*

Introduction

Southeast Asia has become a region prone to violent internal state conflict. Possessing a unique physical and cultural geography prone to diverse and disparate populations, Southeast Asia has also developed in a manner ignorant of local cultural differences, leaving certain communities marginalized within the larger nation. In a global situation of increased integration, alienated groups in Southeast Asia find themselves readily susceptible to radical fundamentalism manifested in violence. Holding sovereignty and national inviolability as core precepts of their normative structure, Southeast Asian nations often find themselves the sole responsible actors for remedying these internal situations. Such circumstances demand solutions tailored to the region's distinctive nature, addressing the roots of the propensity for internal violence, while at the same time attacking external and extremist forces that aggravate the situation.

Regional Characteristics: Geography, History, Economy

Southeast Asia, which lies at the point of intersection for several major civilizations and cultural influences, acts as a crossroads for beliefs, ideas and ethnicities. While on a macro level such conditions have resulted in a melting pot, the region's archipelagic nature makes such integration inconsistent at best. Pockets of cultural homogeneity survive, isolated from integration by geographic barriers such as sea lanes, dense jungle, and mountainous terrain. Absent interaction and integration with their surroundings, and possessed of unique natural conditions not elsewhere reproduced, these communities develop cultural identities distinct from their neighbors.

Historically, such cultural disputes have been marginalized by the impositions of an overbearing colonial power. With a common enemy in the colonial power, diverse communities often acted in concert to pursue regional autonomy and independence. The eventual retreat of these colonial powers left in place a system of nation-states that ignored local cultural differences and boundaries. National control often fell to the hands of the mainstream culture that the powers were most familiar with, in the form of autocracies; other groups were granted limited or no voice. Therefore minority groups found their interests contradictory to the dominant national interest, and themselves without legitimate avenues for political change.

As economic pursuits overtook military power as the dominant tool for development, the political marginalization of minority groups translated into economic marginalization.

Accumulated capital and other fruits of development became localized in geographic regions and cultural communities favored by the politically empowered. This resulting disparity further alienated the underprivileged minority, and kept education and economic opportunities, which often act as moderating influences politically, out of distant provinces.

Regional Terrorism: Moderate Base, Extremist Minority

Arising from unique geographical, historical and economic conditions, the alienation of minority communities has resulted in a distinctive type of insurgent movement. With negative sentiments located in culturally isolated communities, insurgents frequently enjoy popular support in particular localities. With individual interests and a sense of identity distinct from, even hindered by, the state, many of these communities see secessionism as a necessary step towards progress. Violence presents itself as a necessary tool to coerce the state to give in to their demands because legitimate political channels would never countenance compromising national sovereignty through autonomy or secession. While such movements are present worldwide, their prevalence in culturally homogenous and geographically isolated regions makes Southeast Asian insurgencies particularly robust.

The rising force of globalization promotes similar sentiments of alienation in isolated, minority communities. Principally originating with former colonial powers, globalization threatens new ideas incongruent with the traditional cultures from which these communities derive their identity. In addition, the economic growth promoted by globalization remains inequitably distributed, strengthening the disparity between mainstream and fringe communities. The resulting dissatisfaction results in a propensity for fundamentalism and radicalism by individuals thoroughly resistant to the prevalent global system.

Consequently, the rising global force of Islamic fundamentalism has found Southeast Asia fertile ground for their agenda. Ironically gathering converts via the system of globalization they oppose, Islamic fundamentalist ideas have proven to be a factor particularly conducive to radicalism in the region. Islamic fundamentalism is further aided by the historical ties of these minorities to Muslim culture. Because the region is strategically advantageous, possessed of isolated communities and geographic protection, Islamic fundamentalists strive to gain footholds in Southeast Asia. In exchange, they provide both ideological and material support for secessionist movements. Hence, global radicalism and local insurgencies often exist in symbiosis, each strengthening the other.

These factors present a unique model of Southeast Asian terrorism: broad, relatively moderate communities motivated by alienation from the state supporting and cooperating with radical extremists seeking the destruction of the status quo. While these two factions may act in concert, their spectrum of motivations, from moderate desire for empowerment to extremist hatred for the global system, stands out among terrorist movements worldwide, and dictates a response sensitive to the region's distinctive traits.

Regional Counter-Terrorism: Methods and Strategies

In combating their unique regional model of terrorism, Southeast Asian nations must pursue a two-pronged approach, targeting both extremist and moderate ends of the terrorist spectrum. Extremists seeking the destruction of the status quo are incompatible with the state's interest in stability; therefore no short or long-term negotiation is feasible. Moderates meanwhile compose the broad majority of insurgent movements; they are individuals with genuine grievances conceivably addressable without betraying the national interest. Beyond the

enforcement of law and order and containment of violence standard today, short-term measures must include the strategic elimination of extremists with whom the state cannot compromise. Long-term measures must target the motivations of moderate factions with addressable concerns, ameliorating their political and economic alienation, and ultimately encouraging the integration of the secessionist community into the greater national whole.

The assumption that the motivations of extremist factions are not reconcilable with the national interest necessitates a strategy outside traditional state action. Normal boundaries of state behavior are adjusted given the imminent threat and incompatible differences between their interests and those of the state. Actions inappropriate in traditional law enforcement are no longer off limits; military action, assassination, interrogation, even torture applied in practice. Civil rights, designed to protect citizens within the traditional state system, give way to strategic needs in regard to extremists. The extent to which these boundaries shift depends upon the national identity, values, and public opinion of a given state; these factors may vary case to case, day to day. Evaluating the propriety of such actions is a delicate and dangerous process; miscalculations may transgress national and/or international conceptions of morality, and cost the state needed support. Yet non-traditional means prove necessary in defending the state against those who would destroy it; states inevitably must be willing to risk such transgressions and employ non-traditional avenues of attack to decisively contain and eliminate manifestations of extremism.

But while extremists are targeted for liquidation, moderates should be dealt with through means within the state system, respecting limits on police power and civil rights while pursuing accommodation through policy and legislation. Concerns regarding political and economic alienation can and should be addressed through long-term reform. Devolution of political power can provide legitimate avenues for the pursuit of local interests; active and visible involvement of minority groups in government and society provide the state more legitimacy in the minds of the disenfranchised. Increased economic opportunities also alleviate the strain of integration; they should be cultivated through improved infrastructures, better educational opportunities, and direct investment in disadvantaged regions.

Ultimately, government policies aimed at alleviating moderate motivations for insurgency should also aim at enhanced integration of the minority group into the nation. Improved communications infrastructures and educational opportunities spread liberal ideas into fundamentalist communities, frequently resulting in a shrinking ideological gap between the state and locality. Better communication and transportation infrastructures allow for the creation of inter-personal relations nationwide; the resulting empathic ties invariably inhibit violent action. By actively incorporating isolated regions into the national community, Southeast Asian nations may encourage the integration and resulting common interest that naturally occurs elsewhere, reducing the disparities of interest that fuel potentially violent insurgencies.

Conclusion

While culturally diverse, Southeast Asia's unique geography results in a propensity for isolated communities of disparate interests, hindering regular patterns of integration and consolidation. With a historical development guided by colonial fiat rather than cultural consideration, the nations of the region face an insurgent situation of uncommon robustness. Despite the difficult moral and analytical decisions required, identifying and addressing the varying motivations of both moderate and extremist insurgents is the only effective means to solve the problem of terrorism, in both the short and long term.

Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia: Chances of a Nuclear Conflict

Discussion Leader: Gerald Meyerle, *University of Virginia, United States*

Delegates: Aalok Gupta, *National University of Singapore, India*
Mithra de Alwis, *Macquarie University, Australia*
Stefan Menden, *University of Cologne, Germany*
Ethan Baker, *University of Maryland, United States*
Zack Suh, *Yonsei University, Republic of Korea*
Sun Jung Oh, *Sogang Graduate School, Republic of Korea*

Prospects of War and Peace in South Asia

In the summer of 1999, India and Pakistan became the first nuclear powers to fight a conventional war. Fortunately, this short armed conflict remained limited to Kashmir, as Pakistan pulled back from Indian territory, and India refrained from crossing into Pakistan. Both sides, however, seriously considered upping the conventional stakes, and are known to have readied nuclear weapons for launch. The danger of nuclear war again worried the world when an allegedly Pakistan-backed terrorist attack on India's Parliament in December 2001 led to a mobilization of almost one million Indian and Pakistani troops along the disputed Line of Control in Kashmir. India considered attacking alleged terrorist training camps in Pakistan – a move that would have caused a war with yet greater nuclear risks.

These examples show that the danger of nuclear war is very high in South Asia, a region traditionally ignored by scholars, journalists, and policy makers. This tragic situation is linked to many difficult issues, including military confrontation over Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, endemic mistrust between India and Pakistan, and the possibility for limited war under the nuclear umbrella. This white paper seeks to address the dangers of nuclear war on the subcontinent, and the potential for greater peace in the future. Another confrontation could occur at any time, in the event of another terrorist attack or military maneuver in Kashmir. By overlooking the familiar subject of proliferation, we hope to focus greater attention on the immediate need to reduce the risks of war between two countries that already possess nuclear weapons.

The Fight over Kashmir

The primary source of tensions between the two countries is the struggle over the disputed Kashmir region. Three of the four Indo-Pakistan wars were over Kashmir. Indian-held Kashmir has been wracked by a 14-year long insurgency in which Pakistan plays an important part by lending money, arms, and training to militants. More ruthless groups that India claims are also linked to Pakistan have begun to use suicide bombers to attack vital Indian institutions outside Kashmir, such as the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The gulf between both countries' positions remains as unbridgeable as ever, and is likely to become more so if terrorism in India escalates.

India occupies the majority of Kashmir, and is the status quo power in this conflict. Though in principle India claims the entire state, in reality its leaders favor the status quo.

Pakistan adamantly claims the entire state and seeks to change the territorial status quo, either through international intervention, the fostering of militants and political forces in Indian-held Kashmir that favor accession to Pakistan, or military force. As international attention has withered, Pakistan has relied increasingly on the latter two options. The slow moderation of Kashmiri politics in recent times has narrowed Pakistan's options further towards military confrontation. While this may bode well for India's Kashmir position, it does not bode well for peace.

Might Someone Use Nuclear Weapons?

Pakistan's generals have threatened to use nuclear weapons if India were to strike its territory. Some say this is a bluff, others take the threat very seriously. Either way, no one knows what a proud and desperate Pakistan might do when pushed to the wall in the fog of war. Using nuclear weapons may be the only way for a weaker Pakistan to avert total defeat at the hands of its avowed enemy, India – a larger, stronger, and more stable power.

It is possible Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to destroy an Indian military advance, or to break the will of the Indian public in a suicidal bet that India will decide a second strike is futile. Many such nightmare scenarios exist, all in the realm of the immediately possible. Pakistan's intention, of course, is merely to deter India's conventional superiority. But imprudent policies by either side or inadequate responses from the international community could lead to unintended consequences.

India has a declared no first-strike policy. This reflects India's interests as a status-quo power confident in its ability to push back any large-scale attack from across the border. The risk of nuclear weapons being used comes mostly from Pakistan, though a strike by India cannot be ruled out. It is more likely that India might attempt a pre-emptive conventional strike on Pakistan's nuclear facilities in the event of serious escalation, a move that could prompt a desperate early nuclear strike by Pakistan. This is only one of many possible scenarios.

What the above discussion seeks to point out, above all, is that real risks of a wider war and nuclear exchange – either against military or civilian targets – is possible, and perhaps imminent. The long-term interests of both countries militate against war and the risks involved, but short-term concerns – especially defensive ones – top the agendas of both countries. While not wanting to be alarmist, the authors of this report do not want to be dismissive of the risks, considering the volatile and yet unresolved events of the past few years.

The Gamble of Limited War

Strategists on both sides of the border are thinking hard about the possibilities and implications of war beneath the nuclear umbrella. Proponents of what is called 'limited war' argue that if a conventional conflict is limited geographically and further escalation is avoided, the other side will not use nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have very different reasons for considering this scenario, and divergent opinions as to the possibility of unwanted escalation.

India has threatened to cross into Pakistani territory, either to destroy alleged terrorist training camps following another allegedly Pakistan-backed terrorist attack, or force a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Indian-held Kashmir in the event of another 1999-style intrusion. Proponents of limited war in India argue for a rapid strike, followed by either complete withdrawal, or the occupation of strategic peaks just across the Line of Control. How else, they argue, is India to force Pakistan to stop militant infiltration? Surely a post 9/11 world will understand India's need to engage in a pre-emptive strike to prevent further terrorist attacks.

Such a limited and, Indian proponents argue, justifiable and essentially defensive attack on disputed territory would not carry the danger of a nuclear response. It would, however, cause another war that could spiral out of control if Pakistan responds in kind. It could also backfire and lead to a temporary loss of territory in Kashmir that may force Indian leaders to escalate the conflict. India's decision not to cross into Pakistan-held Kashmir after extensive mobilization along the LOC after December 2001 reflects India's belief for the time being that the risks outweigh the benefits.

The Pakistan military looks upon limited war as a means of forcing India to make territorial concessions in Kashmir without risking a full-scale war that Pakistan, as a smaller power, would probably lose in the long run. Pakistan is the only power to have gambled on limited war, infiltrating troops into Indian Kashmir in 1999 and sparking a short armed conflict. Timely US intervention forced the Pakistan military to pull back, preventing a wider war.

Pakistan's generals believe they can match and perhaps defeat India in a short conflict in Kashmir. They hope that the threat of nuclear war will bring swift international pressure to bear upon India to prevent escalation. It is, of course, a gamble. The Indian response may be too strong, and Pakistan, as the aggressor, may be the one to face international pressure. The danger of escalation to nuclear war is less of a concern for Pakistan, though no less a risk.

Limited war remains a hot concept in South Asian military thinking. Pakistan's implementation of this idea in 1999 carried huge risks, but yielded scant dividends. The reality of Kashmir and the military balance in the subcontinent is too complicated and contingent for either power to accurately predict the outcome. There is no way to control escalation, especially if serious mistakes are made, or one side believes the other intends to conduct an early strike on the other's nuclear facilities, or use tactical nuclear weapons against the other's military formations.

The Wild Card of Cross-Border Terrorism

India's military mobilization following the attack on its Parliament revealed the desperation of Indian leaders who believe their attempts to combat terrorism from across the border have been unsuccessful. Perhaps inspired by America's attack on the Taliban for sheltering Al-Qaeda, Indian leaders have seriously considered attacking alleged terrorist training camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir as the only means to stop what they see as increasingly bold attacks by suicide bombers on India's most vital institutions. During the attack on the Indian Parliament, police at the last second prevented suicide bombers from entering the open hall, where the entirety of India's parliamentarians had gathered for the day's business. Had the bombs exploded inside, much of India's national leadership would have perished.

Claiming the attackers were linked to Pakistan, India prepared for war, backing down only at the last minute, after the US assured India they would pressure Pakistan to crack down on cross-border terrorism. Infiltration decreased temporarily but again resumed with a vengeance, bringing a rapid escalation of violence. Many in India believe that fighting insurgency internally is futile as long as the source remains safe in camps across the border. While Pakistan's generals suggest they do have some control over militant activity in the Kashmir Valley, they deny any connection to the Parliament attack, or to any of the more dastardly terrorist attacks on civilians outside Kashmir.

If true, this raises some very troubling questions. Could a small terrorist outfit operating independently of any known government cause a major war between two nuclear powers? Is Pakistan controlling these groups, or merely hiding behind a cloak of plausible deniability that allows its military to weaken its neighbor from within without facing the consequences? Or is

Pakistan's denial of involvement genuine? Perhaps Pakistan does support these groups, but its control is limited? If so, what is the extent of Pakistan's control? Can its military put a stop to terrorist activity operating from its soil? If so, will this stop the problem? Without answering these questions, it is hard to know with certainty what the risks are of another war.

Steps Toward Peace?

A number of possible solutions to the Kashmir conflict have been floated. One is that Kashmir be given to Pakistan, and another an independent Kashmir. A third is partitioning of Indian Kashmir along religious lines and the cession of the Muslim area to Pakistan. A fourth is conversion of the LOC into an international boundary with international monitoring of cross-border infiltration -- that is, sanctification of the status quo. The authors of this paper believe that the last solution is the most viable, but faces many obstacles unlikely to be overcome in the near future.

The first step towards a solution is talks between India and Pakistan. There are several factors that should be taken into account, however. India's precondition is that Pakistan stop support to militancy in Kashmir. But Pakistan's leaders may not be able to meet this condition. They may face violent opposition, as many militant organizations operate in Pakistan outside the authority of the government. Military officers also feel strongly about the Kashmir issue, which has been the center point of Pakistan's military policy from the beginning. A sudden about turn could cause a coup by more hawkish officers. Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharaff, depends heavily on the military to stay in power and faces growing public opposition, especially by Islamist groups. It is also unclear whether the Pakistan military actually controls all militants operating in Indian-Occupied Kashmir.

Several factors impede concessions India's part. Indian leaders at the helm of a weak coalition government face tight political constraints that preclude too many concessions. Indian leaders are firmly opposed to negotiating under the pressure of terrorist attacks they believe are supported from across the border. There is rising support in India for a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan, including the possibility of a pre-emptive strike as an alternative to peace talks. Indian leaders believe their many peace moves have been met with military aggression by Pakistan or escalating cross-border militancy. Indian leaders cite their Prime Minister's good-will trip to Pakistan in 1999, followed months later by Pakistan's intrusion into Kashmir. The authors of this report are cautiously skeptical about the likelihood of bilateral talks resulting in a durable solution at this point in time.

Greater hope lies in the possibility of increased people-to-people contacts across the border, as the people of both countries have shown a strong desire for peace. Violence on the subcontinent has impeded development, trade, and social welfare – a point that does not escape the attention of its people. Some examples of people-to-people contact include increased rail, bus, and air links between India and Pakistan, followed by cultural, academic, and journalistic exchanges that help break down the walls of distrust constructed by both governments and fifty years of protracted conflict. This will help humanize the situation, take it out of the hands of self-serving political leaders, and make both sides realize that they share many common interests such as peace and stability.

US-Japan Security Alliance in a Dynamic Asia: Prospects and Challenges

Discussion Leader: Daniel Kliman, Stanford University, *United States*

Delegates: Emre Saraoglu, *Kyoto University, Turkey*
Magdalena J. Seol, *Seoul National University, South Korea*
Akira Tsuchiya, *Georgetown University, Japan*
Yuki Asano, *Nagoya University, Japan*
Naoko Iwakiri, *E.M. Lyon, France*

Introduction

During HPAIR 2003 our group discussed the future of the US-Japan security alliance. We began by tracing the decade-long evolution of the bilateral security relationship. Next, we analyzed Japan's national interest in order to avoid basing our discussion on unexamined assumptions. We then discussed Japan's future global and regional security roles, and identified East Asian perceptions as a key constraint on the expansion of the bilateral alliance. Subsequently, we extended the scope of analysis to constitutional revision and discussed the impact amending Article 9 would have on Japan's neighbors. Lastly, we examined future challenges for the bilateral security alliance.

Historical Background

The end of the Cold War witnessed a period of uncertainty in the US-Japan security alliance. In the early 1990s the US appeared to largely ignore Japan in favor of deepening its relationship with China. This neglect was partly due to Japan's failure to accept a more active security role during the first Gulf War. However, the 1994 crisis on the Korean peninsula resulted in US and Japanese policymakers deciding that the alliance needed to be reinvigorated in order to maintain regional stability. This led to the Clinton-Hashimoto Accord in 1996 and the revising of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines in 1997. The 1998 North Korean missile flyover accelerated discussion on extending the scope of the alliance. Recent changes in Japan's defense policy reflect the Japanese government's decision to expand Japan's role within the alliance. Major changes in Japan's defense policy include greater BMD cooperation, dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, the enactment of the widely-debated Emergency Legislation, and the future dispatch of the SDF to Iraq.

Japan's National Interest

Our group asked two related questions: (1) What are Japan's national interests, and; (2) How does Japan pursue these national interests? We identified four key national interests held by Japan:

National Sovereignty. Maintaining territorial integrity and independence represents Japan's foremost national interest. National sovereignty also includes domestic stability and the physical security of Japanese nationals from forced abduction.

Regional Stability. Preventing major conflicts in East Asia and countering existing threats is another key Japanese national interest. Threats include North Korea's nuclear weapons, North Korea's long range missiles, terrorism, and China's military buildup.

Resource Security. Resource security means ensuring Japan a constant, reliable source of natural resources, particularly oil.

Free Trade. Under conditions of free trade Japan has full access to foreign markets and can export and import. Free trade is essential for Japan to retain its status as an economic great power.

Japan pursues these interests both through its own defense policy and the US-Japan security alliance:

National Sovereignty. The Self Defense Forces protect Japan from outside invasion. US troops in Japan provide additional anti-invasion support while the US-Japan security treaty deters a nuclear attack. Even so, there are sovereignty issues which the US-Japan security treaty cannot address: the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.

Regional Stability. Japan seeks to preserve cordial relations with major states in the region, especially China. At the same time, the presence of US bases in Japan deters a China-Taiwan conflict. While Japan continues to rely on the US nuclear umbrella, the Japanese government is also developing its own missile defense system to protect against the North Korean threat. Missile defense may also be a hedge against a future China threat.

Resource Security and Free Trade: Japan relies on the US Navy to ensure freedom of navigation in East Asia. Additionally, Japan seeks to ensure good relations with major oil producing countries through ODA.

Japan's Global Security Role

A disparity may exist between US hopes for the bilateral alliance and Japan's ability to assume new global security roles. US officials would like Japan to adopt an international role more commensurate with its economic power as well as its stake in the existing international order. In particular, the US would like Japan to become more active in global peacekeeping beginning with SDF dispatch to Iraq. However, our group identified international legitimacy as a primary constraint on Japanese peacekeeping operations. In the case of Iraq, the absence of a UN Security Council resolution has rendered a Japanese dispatch of the SDF difficult. We observed that Japanese groups opposing the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq rest their case on the safety of SDF personnel to directly appeal to the public. Despite the requirement for international legitimacy, PKO operations represent the most likely global security role for Japan in the near future. Our group speculated that future reconstruction efforts might utilize Japan's growing number of technically educated retirees.

Japan's Regional Role

Regional concerns will continue to constrain Japan's security role within East Asia. One of the few Japanese activities in East Asia that would be acceptable to most nations is

peacekeeping operations. However, Japan could not unilaterally initiate peacekeeping operations in East Asia. Additionally, the SDF would not be able to participate in combat-like peace enforcement operations, either within East Asia or globally.

Although Japan may develop the capability to independently ensure freedom of navigation in East Asia, it is unlikely that it will conduct sea-lane defense missions in the near future. Given Japan's historical legacy, the regional reaction to unilateral MSDF dispatch in East Asia would be severe. Already, South Korea's future naval procurement plans reflect concerns with the MSDF's current force posture. However, if embedded in the US-Japan security alliance—MSDF vessels would patrol as part of the US 7th Fleet—a Japanese sea-lane defense role might produce a relatively muted reaction in East Asia. This embedding might be similar to that of the German military's position within NATO. On the other hand, the prohibition on collective self-defense and the lack of a regional security institution similar to NATO constitute two immediate factors which decrease the likelihood of joint sea-lane defense.

Constitutional Revision

Our group noted that Article 9 does not reflect the reality of Japan's security interests in the Northeast Asian regional security equation. The current constitution poses a major barrier to strengthening the alliance. Our group decided that several factors will preclude revision of Article 9 during the foreseeable future. First, Japanese domestic opinion might not be supportive of an amendment. Second, and more critically, the regional reaction to a constitutional amendment could be severe. Given Japan's wartime legacy, it is highly probable that East Asian states, particularly China and South Korea, would perceive constitutional revision as a sign of reemerging Japanese militarism. Tampering with the constitution is thus easy to propose, but difficult to realize.

Reinterpreting the constitution seems to be the more acceptable of the two options. This strategy could provide a means for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. However, one danger with reinterpretation is that no hard limits exist to further new interpretations—reinterpretation may represent a slippery slope toward revision.

Future of the Alliance

Lastly, our group discussed the future of the US-Japan security alliance. The following developments would lead to a stronger bilateral security relationship, thus securing the interests of both parties:

Institutionalization of security relations: one step in this direction was the recent enactment of the Emergency Legislation. Clear definition of Japanese missions and roles in various contingencies is also necessary to institutionalize the alliance.

Exercising the right of collective self-defense: this could occur either through reinterpretation or constitutional revision. Additionally, exercising the right of collective self-defense would facilitate a greater Japanese global security role.

Deploying the SDF overseas: from a US perspective, Japanese troop contributions as well as material support is necessary to make the alliance more equal.

Base realignment: reconsolidation of the US bases in Okinawa would diminish the intrusive presence of American forces in Japan. One step in this direction would be moving forward on the SACO report.

Future challenges that might weaken the alliance include:

Domestic opposition to the US presence in Japan: while this is largely limited to Okinawa, future incidents involving US forces might lead to growing opposition in the Japanese main islands as well.

Japanese failure to act in a contingency: Japanese inability to meet US requests for more active support in a contingency might result in intra-alliance tensions similar to that of the 1991 Iraqi crisis.

Our group concluded that despite these potential challenges, the future of the US-Japan security alliance appears bright. As Japan's defense policy evolves, the alliance will take on an increasingly global dimension.

Preventing North Korea's Nuclear Armament

Discussion Leader: Steven Park, *University of California Berkeley, United States*

Delegates: Inho Thomas Cho, *Chung Ang University, Republic of Korea*
Dannielle Engle, *Northwestern University, United States*
Kenneth Jader, *Miriam College, Philippines*
Eun-Ha Kim, *Georgetown University, United States*
Keun Lee, *Stanford University, United States*
Jo Ann Paula Reyes, *Miriam College, Philippines*
Stella Shin, *Stanford University, United States*
Amanda Wetzel, *Queens University, Ireland*
Arne Wiechmann, *University of St. Gallen, Switzerland*

When North Koreans met U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly at the October 2002 talks held in Pyongyang, they continued their use of “intimidation tactics” by declaring that they have a nuclear weapons program. More recently, North Korea made the claim that they possessed nuclear bombs, an assessment made previously by the U.S. intelligence community.

While it is difficult to say if North Korea actually possesses nuclear weapons capabilities, a potentially nuclear North Korea is a big concern to the five nations to be present at the upcoming August 2003 six-party talks in Beijing as well as much of the rest of the world. Based on many years of deceptive tactics that North Korea has employed, the United States officials and their Japanese, Chinese, Russian, and South Korean colleagues enter the talks with deep suspicions if not distrust.

Correspondingly, North Korea's Kim Jong-il regime equally distrusts the United States based on what they call the United States' failure to uphold its side of the bargain agreed to in the Agreed Framework of 1994. Therefore, it is likely that North Korea will demand mechanisms that will firmly bind the United States to any concessions it may make in the course of the negotiations.

On the eve of the six-party talks, this paper proposes a strategy of offering “carrots” to North Korea, which meet its basic demands of security assurances, normalization of relations, and economic aid in return for an internationally verified dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons development program.

Trust will continue to be at issue at each step of the process. As the negotiations proceed, the United States and North Korea must build confidence and trust if the talks are to bear any fruitful results. The multilateral format of the talks, and especially the active involvement of Russia and China, may prove to be crucial in the endeavor of building trust between North Korea and the United States.

The United States and North Korea clearly represent the most important parties to the talks and come to the table with the most specific demands. Since the October 2002 North Korean statement of nuclear capabilities, the United States has articulated several clear reservation points for the upcoming negotiations. The United States demands that North Korea discontinue its nuclear program, facilitate and allow comprehensive, verifiable, and intrusive

inspections of any North Korean nuclear facility, end its exports of ballistic missiles, and more generally, discontinue its production and deployment of all weapons of mass destruction. The main demands of North Korea include: a security guarantee in the form of a non-aggression pact; normalization of diplomatic relations with the world community in general and the United States in particular; removal from the U.S. State Department's list of nations that sponsor terrorism; assistance with its energy needs; economic aid and loans from international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank; forgiving North Korea's debts and permitting access to international capital markets.

In seeking a negotiated solution to the current nuclear crisis, this team of delegates proposes a negotiation strategy that, if followed by the United States and North Korea, could lead to a peaceful settlement.

Although it is not possible to predict the precise dynamics of the negotiation process, we can predict that a moderation of the current hard-line negotiation positions of North Korea and the United States will be crucial. In order to achieve such moderation, we recommend that the United States take the first steps and make the following concession, signaling to North Korea its intention to resolve this conflict peacefully: The United States will de-list North Korea from the State Department's list of terrorist supporting nations if North Korea agrees to an internationally verifiable nuclear freeze including discontinuing all nuclear activities, shutting down the testing reactors, stopping the reprocessing of spent fuel rods, and stopping the procurement of nuclear weapons components.

To some, this first negotiation point may seem extreme. However, this position provides clear benefits to the North Korean state and addresses some of its economic concerns immediately. For example, by removing North Korea from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, the IMF and World Bank could begin processing North Korean applications for financial assistance.

Once North Korea agrees to these initial terms, then the next negotiation point should include setting the terms of an international verification process for the nuclear freeze. In addition, taking this position gives the United States an immediate "stick" in further negotiations. If North Korea does not cooperate with the proposed international inspection regime, then the economic benefits provided by the nuclear freeze will be removed from North Korea.

Therefore, if the North Koreans agree to the first U.S. term of negotiation, the United States should then introduce the following position: If North Korea wants to maintain continuing international recognition, it must uphold its agreement to have an internationally verified nuclear freeze. Therefore, the United States proposes a team of inspectors should be sent to North Korea under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the endorsement of a UN Security Council Resolution. If such a position became completely unacceptable to North Korea, the United States could propose an alternative that North Korea may select between Russia or China (as one of North Korea's premier international partners), and one of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, or Poland to form a joint composition of an inspection team. In return for this cooperation of inspections, the London and Paris Clubs could forgive the loans North Korea defaulted, which would allow North Korea to tap into international capital markets again.

After the United States secures North Korean cooperation of weapons inspections, it should quickly move to set a timetable for dismantling those nuclear weapons. For instance, after a year of inspections, the United States may want greater security from the international threat of North Korea and demand the dismantling of nuclear weapons. Depending on the level of North Korean security concerns, the United States could propose a more rapid time scale for

dismantling and putting any North Korean weapons beyond use. The immediate success of this proposal depends on the desirability of a “non-binding” non-aggression pact to the North Koreans.

Therefore, the United States should propose: If North Korea agrees to, in concert with the UN force, pull-back from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in 5 Km initial intervals, simultaneously reduce its arms, and disarm its nuclear weapons, then the United States will enter a non-legally binding non-aggression pact through a U.S. Senate resolution encouraging peace and friendship between the DPRK and the U.S. The benefits to offering a non-legally binding non-aggression assurance will allow North Korea to again save face while putting its weapons beyond use and initiating a disarmament process along the DMZ.

If the United States follows a moderate, three-pronged negotiation strategy with North Korea, greater security for the immediate region as well as the United States and North Korea could be within reach.

However, it is highly unlikely that the North Korean delegation will immediately agree to any of the U.S. demands, even if given the significant carrots that will be put on the table. Therefore, it is in the United States’ advantage to build up carrots that can be turned into sticks to compel North Korea to continue negotiations. In addition, the role of the United States’ negotiation partners cannot be underestimated. China, Russia, and Japan all have primary interests in nuclear disarmament of North Korea, but also may have smaller secondary interests. For example, it has been suggested that Russia could open a railway trade route through North Korea into South Korea through South Korean funding. Such a measure would provide economic benefit to all parties and would also be a confidence building measure between the North and the South. Therefore, as the United States enters negotiation, it should do so with a moderate, yet determined approach to nuclear disarmament and, at critical times, should allow its allies to use their influence and smaller “carrot cards” in order to cajole North Korea into cooperation. A coordinated, multilateral, and truly international approach to engaging North Korea in negotiations may lead to a vast improvement in East Asian security and indeed could bring the Korean peninsula one step closer to a lasting peace.

Deconstructing the North Korea Nuclear Crisis: A Chinese Blueprint

Discussion Leader: Dr. John S. Park, *Harvard University, United States*

Delegates: Sarah Park, *Harvard University, United States*
Constantin Crachilov, *Harvard University, United States*
Soojin Nam, *Harvard University, United States*
Eunwoo Kim, *University of Virginia, United States*
Nicole Curato, *University of the Philippines, Philippines*
Ga Young Park, *Sookmyung Women's University, ROK*
Bomsu Park, *Sookmyung Women's University, ROK*
Leon Smith, *University of San Francisco, United States*

I. Charting the Political Minefield

- DMZ Minefield analogy
 - Post Korean War, mines in DMZ were mapped out in detail
 - Monsoon rains shifted the mines and made the maps irrelevant
 - New map required
 - Likewise, new map is required for current nuclear crisis compared to 1994

- How did we get here?
 - The October meeting between James Kelly (US) and Kang Suk-Ju (DPRK) and the admission of Highly-Enriched Uranium program was a pivotal event
 - As Professor Moon Chung-In of Yonsei University points out, the misinterpretation of Kang Suk-Ju's statement began a freefall in US-DPRK relationship
 - A series of withdrawals by DPRK from international institutions and agreements soon followed
 - DPRK then proceeded to dismantle surveillance cameras from critical facilities
 - Expulsion of international nuclear inspectors further heightened crisis

II. Deconstructing the Multi-Dimensional Nuclear Crisis

	US	South Korea	China	Japan
Nuclear Proliferation				
Ballistic Missiles				
North Korean Refugees				
Korea Reunification				

III. Resolving the Crisis

- Current nuclear crisis is a symptom of North Korea's three chronic illnesses:
 - Insecurity / Paranoia
 - Economic malaise
 - Long-term survival concerns

- How can the crisis be resolved?
 - Joel Wit mentioned the leading role that China can play in pressuring North Korea and United States to find a solution
 - What would this role specifically look like?

- Three-Stage Chinese Blueprint
 - (1) Conducting bilateral talks by China with all principal parties in order to gauge their singular wants, needs, and concerns
 - (2) Drafting initial blueprint incorporating the above followed by multi-lateral talks
 - (3) Constructing multi-lateral institutions to implement the blueprint and monitor the progress

- Why China?
 - It is in China's vested national interest to definitively resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula
 - China provides lifeline in terms of fuel and food aid to Kim Jong Il's regime and hence maintains leverage over North Korea
 - Other countries' efforts to resolve the crisis can be effectively coordinated through the blueprint to comprehensively deal with North Korea
 - Though it would be an arduous and long process, China – through its blueprint – has the opportunity to become a US strategic partner rather than strategic competitor
 - In doing so, China will be able to effectively expand its regional influence and boost its international prestige.

Asian Security Abstracts

Taiwanese Nationalism and Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan

Hsin-Hui Serena Chang, McGill University

Tension between Taiwan and Mainland China is a factor that can deeply threaten regional security. An abundant literature has examined issues in cross-Strait relations, but the crucial role of Taiwanese nationalism in the conflict has not been adequately addressed. This paper considers the impact of Taiwanese nationalism on the foreign policy of Taiwan and analyzes responsive action from the Mainland. The paper demonstrates a close relationship between the ruling elite's promotion of a new Taiwan-centered state nationalism in the 1990s and Taipei's pursuit of international legitimization. Such a policy agenda significantly affects Beijing's Taiwan policy and cross-Strait dynamics. This paper also explores economic factors acting as constraints on the political expression of Taiwanese nationalism.

US-ROK Interaction in the Security Alliance: Modeling the Impact of SOFA Incidents and the North Korean Threat

Leif-Eric Easley, Harvard University

Security relations between the United States and Republic of Korea are largely driven by incidents involving the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the degree of threat posed by North Korea. This paper constructs and applies two models for examining how these key factors impact upon US-ROK interaction in the security alliance. The primary approach is a dynamic model dealing with stocks of security/political costs and benefits, the levels of which are determined by a system of differential equations. The alternate method presented for analyzing US-ROK security relations employs a game theoretic approach. Both models seek to explain variation in South Korean nationalist and supportive alliance behavior and American unilateralist and cooperative action. The models show that it is not surprising to witness US unilateralism or wavering ROK commitment, and that while the partnership may be strained, the US-ROK alliance is highly durable. However, to effectively deal with North Korea, the US and ROK should be concerned about Korean nationalism, and to cooperatively improve the security environment and avoid war, the US and ROK should be concerned about American unilateralism. Addressing these concerns necessitates a better understanding of the mechanisms behind forward-deployed and host nation cooperation by examining the impact of SOFA incidents and the North Korean threat on US-ROK strategic interaction.

Managing US-Japan BMD Cooperation: Future Challenges and Policy Recommendations

Daniel Matthew Kliman, Stanford University

The layered, multiple engagement BMD system advocated under the US Missile Defense Agency's new doctrine of global missile defense will require increased Japanese BMD participation. Specifically, the Japanese Government will have to decide whether to expand BMD cooperation beyond the research phase to development and deployment. This work seeks

to provide US and Japanese officials with a policy framework for deepening US-Japan BMD cooperation. Using empirical data gathered from interviews with Japanese bureaucrats, private defense specialists, and Tokyo-based US officials, this work identifies significant obstacles to further US-Japan BMD cooperation and offers concrete policy recommendations to facilitate the deployment of Japan-based BMD. Analysis of interview data reveals a two-tiered hierarchy of barriers to further US-Japan BMD cooperation. The first layer of policy challenges stems from general factors characterizing international BMD cooperation: skepticism that BMD will be technically feasible, inability to fund BMD without reallocating defense budgets, and irritation with perceived US unpredictability. The second tier of obstacles to US-Japan BMD cooperation emerges from political structures unique to Japan: constitutional limitations on collective defense, and military export restrictions. This work's policy recommendations include confidence-building measures to demonstrate the efficacy of missile defense technology, a proposal for reinterpreting collective defense to permit further BMD cooperation, and suggestions for redefining Japan's export laws. Finally, this work assesses the future of bilateral missile defense efforts in the context of North Korea's revived nuclear program.

Security and the State, The Emergence of China: Analysis of China's Conventional Military Power

Tai Wei Lim, Cornell University

China's ability to become a regional power seems to be on track. This paper is a survey of China's emerging conventional military power and its implications. It examines China's conventional capabilities with a focus on China's capabilities in fighting localized wars. The paper is divided into several sections, the land forces capabilities or the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the air force or the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Chinese navy or People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). For the PLA section, the reorganization of PLA and its emulation of US military system will be analyzed, especially the emulation of post Gulf War US military forces. In the PLAN section, weaknesses such as an obsolete submarine fleet, the lack of an aircraft carrier, aging destroyers, obsolete technologies and the lack of allied overseas naval bases will be considered. As for the third arm of the military, the PLAAF organizational structure and successful export industries will be examined. Military power is just one aspect of Chinese power projection. Thus, this paper will also touch on regional treaties/military cooperation, and China's relationship with the US, which act as limiting factors on Chinese power projection. Political and economic ties in the region can also serve as limiting or augmenting factors for China's power projection capabilities. As for Sino-US ties, the issues of military sales, technological transfers and technological procurements will be examined. Finally, some technological trends and projections for the Chinese military will serve as a conclusion. As in other branches of its government, China's military reforms will be led by technocrats whose numbers have risen in the political leadership of the Politburo, the military and the bureaucracy.

Conflict Escalation in Kashmir: Internal Security Dilemmas and Governance

Jerry Meyerle, University of Virginia

This paper examines the cycle of conflict escalation in Indian-administered Kashmir through an analysis of the underlying, proximate, and trigger causes of violence. How did relations between Kashmiris and the Indian government remain relatively peaceful for more than three decades, and then deteriorate into secessionist violence in 1989-90? How do we explain militancy and repression that harms the interests of all concerned, and undermines the basic security of both society and the state? I argue that the Kashmir crisis should be understood as the result of a gradual process of escalation whereby underlying tensions escalated to crisis when embattled central leaders undermined Kashmir's political institutions and sparked widespread popular resistance. Several trigger factors such as external involvement, scattered militant attacks, and state repression sent the crisis spiraling into violence. Kashmir is one example of an internal security dilemma common in South Asia. While failing to centralize may endanger state security in restful border provinces where central authority is uncertain, intervention that undermines local institutions can spur widespread resistance that poses an even greater threat. As popular unrest escalates, the center's sense of threat increases while its capacity to accommodate decreases, leading to greater state coercion and more strident resistance that may quickly spiral into violence.

Resolving the Enduring North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Northeast Asian Regional Perspective

John S. Park, Harvard University

With the atomization of interests and concerns within and among the core Northeast Asian countries, a resolution to the current North Korean nuclear crisis appears remote. While recent multilateral talks are symbolically important, the lack of substantive outcomes is alarming. In order to provide an understanding of the complexity of the current situation, this paper deconstructs the distinct interests and concerns that each of the main Northeast Asian countries – South Korea, China, and Japan – has regarding North Korea. In doing so, the primary objectives are to highlight the underlying perspectives of each country regarding North Korea and to explain how a Chinese roadmap could effectively address various security concerns. The opportunity currently exists for China to effect a comprehensive resolution to the nuclear crisis and thereby initiate an important step toward becoming a U.S. strategic partner in Asia.

Regionalism in Northeast Asia: The North Korea Question

Steven S. Park, University of California, Berkeley

There is no doubt that regionalism is slowly shaping the interactions and interconnectedness of the Northeast Asian states. Yet this regionalism is a recent phenomenon. During the Cold War years, North Korea's political system, its alliances, and its provocative behavior created a condition by which member states of the region could not effectively develop comprehensive regional institutions of political, economic, and security ties. However, the traumas that North Korea experienced at the close of the Cold War necessitated external assistance, despite their

proclaimed policy of “Self-Reliance.” As a result, the same North Korea that had prevented regionalism during the Cold War years has unwittingly been the instrumental force in shaping the regionalism of Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era. I have three objectives in the presentation of this paper. First, I will argue that North Korea hindered Northeast Asian regionalism during the Cold War years. In the context that North Korea was a member of an ideological alliance, served as a “buffer zone,” and behaved provocatively and aggressively, North Korea effectively undermined the ability of South Korea and other regional states to develop political, economic, and multilateral security institutions at the regional level. Second, I will argue that North Korea experienced a number of significant traumas at the close of the Cold War era that crippled its economy and its political ability to prevent regionalism from taking place. Third, I will argue that, while North Korea remains an isolated state, it is more a “third wheel” than a genuinely isolated state, drawing both South Korea and China into closer relations out of economic necessity. As a result, the regionalism that has emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War era more closely resembles an informal trilateral regionalism of continental Northeast Asia.

Power and Influence in the South China Sea: Chinese *Realpolitik* and ASEAN’s Faustian Bargain in Increasing Sino-Southeast Asian Interdependence

Robert Zarate, University of Chicago

Could emerging Sino-Southeast Asian economic and security cooperation yield unintended consequences for the South China Sea (SCS) disputes in the future? China, which adamantly claims ownership over the disputed territories and energy resources in the SCS, has forcibly seized territory from rival claimants in several instances since 1974. But the Chinese recently surprised rival claimants, all of whom are now members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), when they agreed to establish a free trade area and sign several multilateral non-aggression pacts with ASEAN. In light of China’s prior pattern of expansion in the SCS, in this paper I ask what future strategic considerations have motivated Beijing to increase Sino-Southeast Asian economic and security cooperation. While optimists would answer that the Chinese are being motivated by benign intentions, my answer is far less sanguine. I argue that China, driven by a *realpolitik* assessment of the international system, aims to translate economic gains from emerging Sino-Southeast interdependence into military might in order to achieve great power status and regional hegemony. As a great power and regional hegemon, China would ultimately aim to: 1) increase its coercive influence over rival ASEAN claimants, 2) deter future American military intervention in the region, and 3) unequivocally secure its claims in the SCS. I conclude by suggesting several strategies which rival ASEAN claimants could adopt to balance against the Chinese quest for more power and influence in the South China Sea.



Left: Tour of the Demilitarized Zone – students saw the DMZ firsthand, including the Third Tunnel and viewing North Korea from Dorasan Observatory.



Above: Tour of the Korean War Memorial Museum. Left: Mr. Joel Wit, Prof. Byung Joon Ahn, Prof. David Kang and Prof. Chung-in Moon debating the current nuclear standoff with North Korea.



Above: Prof. Chung-in Moon discussing prospects for North-South Korean reconciliation. Left: Student delegate presentations.



Above: Prof. Richard Baum, Mr. Leif-Eric Easley and Mr. Joel Wit at the HPAIR closing banquet. Left: Security Workshop student delegates.

